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Abstract
The mystery surrounding the rise and fall of the Tucker automobile
company remains a fascinating piece of U.S. automotive history for both
historians and economists. Francis Ford Coppola’s 1988 movie Tucker: The
Man and His Dream brought to life the difficulties Preston Tucker faced as
he tried to start producing a car years ahead of its time. The movie is
captivating because it attributes the collapse of the Tucker Corporation to
public choice theory. Despite the movie’s portrayal of an alliance between
the automobile industry and the S.E.C. to bring down the Tucker
Company, historians have found no evidence of a conspiracy. Rather, the
collapse of the Tucker Corporation can be attributed to two problems.
First, lack of financial planning and refusal to utilize conventional loans
scared away venture capital. Second, the S.E.C.’s determination that pre-
selling car features was illegal left the Tucker Corporation financially
bankrupt.
JEL Codes: M13, Z11
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I. Introduction
The rise and fall of the Tucker Corporation remains an enigma of
U.S. automotive history. The 1948 Tucker automobile was heralded
as the car of tomorrow, and by performance standards, the car was
years ahead of its time. Inspired by Indianapolis 500 racecars, the
Tucker ’48 “Torpedo” had disc breaks, fuel injection, a rear engine,
and a top speed of 120 miles per hour. For safety, the car featured
seat belts, pop-out windshields, and a middle light that turned with
the steering wheel. Only 51 Tucker ’48 cars were produced before the
company failed. But, as a testament to the Tucker Corporation, today
forty-seven Tucker Torpedoes are still road-worthy; as museum
pieces, each is currently valued at more than $250,000 (Tucker Club).
This creates an intriguing question for private enterprise economists:
If innovation is the source of economic growth in free enterprise,
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why did the Tucker Corporation, with a superior new design to the
American automobile, go bankrupt? The purpose of this educational
note is to answer this question by examining the historical evidence.
Francis Ford Coppola’s 1988 movie, Tucker: The Man and His
Dream © Lucasfilms Ltd., is based on the rise and fall of the Tucker
Corporation. The film is captivating because it attributes the collapse
of the Tucker Corporation to public choice theory.1 The movie
depicts Preston Tucker as a dynamic inventor and an optimistic and
charismatic salesman. The film begins with Tucker’s vision to build a
“car of tomorrow.” After convincing several deal-making individuals
to join his effort, Tucker pre-advertises the car and sells dealerships
to raise money to build a prototype of the Tucker ’48. As work on
the prototype begins, the movie reveals Tucker’s naiveté to the
greater political forces at work to prevent the Tucker ’48 from being
produced. Responsible for Tucker’s demise are a conglomerate of the
“big three” automobile manufacturers, which are threatened by the
car’s innovations, and corrupt politicians who are controlled by the
automobile industry.
The film’s antagonist, U.S. Senator Homer Ferguson of Michigan,
the head of the War Assets Administration, needed backing from the
automobile industry to be re-elected. So, it was in the Senator’s own
interest to oversee the demise of Tucker Corporation. The film
portrays an alliance between the powerful automotive industry, the
U.S. senate, and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In
1946 the commissioner of the SEC was Senator Ferguson’s friend,
Harry McDonald, also from Detroit, Michigan (Rehmke, 1988). The
film alleges political pressure from the automobile industry to
investigate Tucker’s business dealings.2 The SEC investigation leads
to a criminal trial for Preston Tucker and the other Tucker
Corporation executives. In spite of being acquitted at the SEC trial,
the Tucker Corporation was financially bankrupt. Although the film
depicts a captivating hypothesis for the failure of the Tucker
Corporation, artistic liberties were taken to enhance the plot and
condense six years of problems into a 110 minute movie. To date,
                                                 
1 Public choice theory is the idea that the government is an organization. Like all
organizations, the government has its own agenda and acts on behalf of its own
self-interest.
2 Economists call this the capture theory of regulation.  Even a well meaning
regulatory agency over time becomes “captured” by the industry it was created to
regulate.
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historians have found no direct evidence that the automotive industry
was involved in the demise of the Tucker Corporation (Rehmke,
1988). Understanding that Tucker: The Man and His Dream was a
dramatization, I turn to the historical facts to better understand the
collapse of the Tucker Corporation.
II. History of the Tucker Corporation
Preston Tucker (1903-1956) was born September 21, 1903, in
Capac, Michigan.  While growing up, Tucker spent his time after
school in garages during the formative years of the automobile
industry. Upon graduation, Tucker went to work for Studebaker as a
sales person. By 1930 he had become a regional sales manager for the
Pierce-Arrow Corporation (Ford, 1995). At the Indianapolis 500
Preston met the legendary engine designer Harry Miller, and in 1935
they formed the Miller-Tucker Corporation. The company built high-
performance engines for the Ford Racing Team at Indianapolis. In
1943 Miller died, and the Miller-Tucker Corporation could not meet
the engine performance needed to win at Indianapolis, so Henry
Ford cancelled the contract, and the company folded (Tucker Club).
At the onset of World War II, Tucker moved to California and
started a company to design and build a “combat car” for the army.
The car was an armored narrow-wheelbase vehicle with a machine
gun turret on top. Ironically, with a top speed of more than 115 mph,
the army rejected the car because it was deemed “too fast” for
combat (Tucker Club). But the U.S. Navy ordered the car’s gun turret
for use in P.T. boats as well as B-17 and B-29 bombers. As the war
came to a close, orders for the gun turret stopped, and Tucker started
working on new car designs.
During World War II Detroit’s automobile factories were
converted into military equipment production facilities. While the war
raged in Europe and the Pacific, Preston Tucker had ambitions to
build the “Car of Tomorrow” in both performance and safety.
In 1945 World War II ended, and Tucker began the Tucker
Automotive Corporation in his barn with only a few thousand
dollars. But the U.S. military had large factories to build planes, tanks,
and ships that were no longer needed. The War Assets
Administration (WAA) was set up to oversee the liquidation of these
military installations, including an old Dodge plant in Cicero, IL.
Tucker won the lease as the only bidder on the plant. By signing the
lease in July of 1946, Tucker was allowed to move into the Dodge
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plant and agreed to pay $1 million by October 1, 1946, for two years
rent and $2.4 million a year thereafter. After failing to make the rent
payment, the WAA agreed to extend his rent payment date to March
1, 1947. When Tucker again failed to make a payment, the WAA gave
Tucker an ultimatum date of July 1, 1947. Also, they insisted that the
Tucker Corporation must have $15 million in an escrow account in
order to renew the lease (Time 1947).
To raise the money for the lease, Tucker initially decided to get a
bank loan, but for $15 million, banks required control of the Tucker
Corporation. So, Tucker decided instead to sell car dealerships to
raise the money. With no working prototype, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) started investigating the sale of Tucker
dealerships or franchises. Tucker argued that although his business
needed permission from the SEC to sell stock or securities, a
business does not need permission to sell dealerships or franchises.
The SEC disagreed and required the Tucker Corporation to amend
all dealer contracts to state that there was a significant risk of
bankruptcy. With this amendment in place, the Tucker Corporation
was only able to sell $6 million worth of dealerships, rather than the
goal of $15 million (Ford, 1995).
After signing the lease on the Dodge plant, Tucker faced a
second major hurdle in November 1946 when the National Housing
Agency (NHA) ordered the WAA to terminate Tucker’s lease. The
lease for the factory was to be given to the Lustron Corporation to
start building prefabricated housing (Rehmke, 1988). The NHA
based this decision on the perception that houses were more
important than cars in the post-war economy. So from November
1946 until February 1947, the WAA (headed by Senator Homer
Ferguson from Detroit Michigan) tried to break Tucker’s lease.
Tucker spent these four months fighting this breach of contract in
court. In February 1947 the federal court sided with Tucker. The
Tucker Corporation was allowed to keep the plant and the verdict
extended the deadline for the first lease payment to July 1, 1947.
Facing a lease requirement of $15 million due July 1, Tucker still
was short $9 million. To raise the money, Tucker decided to sell
stock. He proposed to SEC an initial public stock offering of $20
million. The SEC agreed to the stock sale conditional on Tucker first
building a working prototype. On June 19, 1947, the prototype
nicknamed the “Tin Goose” was finished. The public presentation of
the Tin Goose created excitement in automotive world, and SEC
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cleared the way for a July 15th initial public offering of Tucker
Corporation stock (Ford, 1995).
In the fall of 1947 things appeared to be going better for the
Tucker Corporation. The company had built the ‘48 prototype and
was converting the former Dodge plant for its first production run.
But by the spring of 1948, problems were again mounting. The initial
public offering of the stock had only raised $15 million, rather than
the expected $20 million. Production had not yet started even though
the company had hired 1,600 new employees. The Tucker
Corporation company had no source of revenue and needed money
for steel and car parts. The company also needed $2.4 million for its
1948 lease payment. So Tucker decided to set up a pre-purchase plan
for the Tucker ‘48. According to the plan, customers would pre-pay
for their car’s accessories. Upon payment customers could pre-order
the features they wanted, including a radio, seat covers, and car color
before each Tucker ‘48 was assembled. In early 1948 the Tucker
Corporation raised $2 million by pre-selling accessories (Ford, 1995).
On May 28, 1948, an SEC investigation determined that pre-
selling accessories was not only illegal, but also fraudulent. The SEC
ordered production of cars stopped and the factory shut down for its
ongoing investigation.  On June 15, 1948, Preston Tucker responded
to the allegations against him in an open letter published in
newspapers across the United States (Tucker, 1948). But in January
1949 the plant was closed, and the Tucker Corporation was bankrupt.
October 5, 1949, the SEC brought Preston Tucker and his board of
directors to trial on charges of fraud (Ford, 1995). On January 22,
1950, a grand jury found the defendants not guilty. But the Tucker
Corporation was liquidated, the WAA confiscated the factory for
failure to make the lease payment, and all of the assets of the Tucker
Corporation, including the fifty-one cars, were sold for 18 cents on
the dollar. The WAA then leased the building to the Lustron
Corporation for pre-fabricated housing.
After being acquitted, Preston Tucker decided to try building cars
again. In 1951 he moved to Brazil and started a new car company. He
designed the “Carioca” sports car, but unfortunately, Preston Tucker
was diagnosed with lung cancer before production could begin. He
continued working on the “Carioca” until his death December 26,
1956 (Ford, 1995).
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III. Conclusion
Despite the portrayal of an alliance between the automotive
industry and the SEC to bring down the Tucker Corporation in the
1988 movie Tucker: The Man and His Dream, historians have found no
evidence of a conspiracy. Rather, historical evidence suggests that the
demise of the Tucker Corporation was the result of two problems.
First, the company’s lack of financial planning led to continual crises.
Tucker’s refusal to utilize conventional bank loans combined with the
company’s attempt to sell dealerships and stock before building a car
prototype scared away normal venture capital. Second, unable to sell
additional stock or dealerships, the Tucker Corporation needed
money to start producing cars. With no inventory to sell and the
SEC’s determination that pre-selling car features was illegal, the
Tucker Corporation was financially bankrupt.
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